It has been long recognized that insured banks can exploit a mispriced risk-independent flat-rate deposit insurance (DI) system by increasing leverage (i.e., decreasing capital ratios) and/or asset risk. Such a behavior is known as moral hazard. There are, however, factors that can induce self-discipline by banks. For instance, charter value is one of such disciplining factors.
1 A flat-rate premium system was in operation in Canada from 1967 to 1998. The premium rate was 1/30 th of 1% per dollar of insured deposits from 1967 to 1985, 1/10 th of 1% from 1986 to 1992, 1/8 th of 1% in 1993 and 1/6 th of 1% from 1994 to 1998. 2 Since the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991, deposit insurance premiums in the US are "risk-adjusted". In Canada, a "pseudo risk-adjusted" system has been adopted in 1999. It classifies insured financial institutions into four risk categories, with premium rates set at 1/24 th of 1% per dollar of insured deposits for Category 1, 1/12 th of 1% for Category 2, 1/6 th of 1% for Category 3 and 1/3 th of 1% for Category 4. Classification in one of the four categories is based on several criteria, such as capital adequacy, profitability, asset concentration and a score given to the financial institution by the Superintendent of Financial Institutions. their specific human capital, they have more to lose if their banks are closed. For instance, Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) find evidence of a relation between ownership structure and risk-taking.
Even in the absence of explicit capital regulation in Canada, which came into effect only in 1983, moral hazard may not manifest itself, due to market discipline, self-discipline or other reasons. It is then important to find whether, after the introduction of flat-rate DI in Canada, commercial banks have exhibited a moral hazard behavior. The levied premiums averaged 0.3780%, or 1/270 th of the banks' total revenues. A natural question is whether or not such level of premiums has induced a dramatic change in the risk-return trade-off of Canadian chartered banks. The answer to this question is indeed an empirical issue. Furthermore, this issue is controversial since before the official implementation of the DI system, the Canadian Banker Association (CBA) has vigorously opposed it, on the ground that, due to self-discipline, banks do not require DI, and should not be forced to cross-subsidize the seemingly weaker trust companies. 4 One plausible reason for the banks' opposition to official DI could be their unwillingness to see imposed an explicit cost for a free guarantee that is already implicitly provided by the Canadian government. 5 Our results fail to detect the presence of moral hazard in the Canadian banking industry following the introduction of flat-rate DI. By and large, consistent with the secular trend documented in Saunders and Wilson (1999) , the total risk of equity, the market risk and the implicit volatility of banks' assets increased. Capital ratios also decreased, mainly in book values. However, we find that these conditions while necessary for any manifestation of moral hazard, are not sufficient conditions for inducing risk-shifting from banks to the CDIC. In fact,
Canadian banks have adjusted their capital in the same direction as their asset risk.
Our paper continues as follows. We present a brief review of selected empirical evidence on moral hazard in Section 2. Our methodology follows in Section 3. After describing our data 4 CBA proposal (Canada, 1967 (Canada, , 2272 (Canada, -2273 . 5 Although the debate which opposed Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993, 1999) to Carr, Mathewson and Quigley (1995) on the issue of implicit guarantee is interesting, due to the lack of stock market data on interest rates paid by banks on their deposits, we cannot address this issue with our empirical approach. Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993) argued that all Canadian banks were technically insolvent in the 1930s. They attributed the no bank failure to the presence of a 100% implicit guarantee from the Canadian government. Carr, Mathewson and Quigley (1995) , rejected this argument, claiming that the Canadian banking stability from 1890 to 1966 was due to two main factors: -the absence of an explicit DI system which induced prudent bank management and monitoring exerted both by depositors and existing regulatory bodies, and -the absence of unit banking and other regulatory barriers to competition.
in Section 4, we discuss our empirical results in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
SELECTED EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON MORAL HAZARD
There are numerous studies on moral hazard in general, mostly with US data, but much less investigation specifically related to the introduction of DI or to premium rate changes. Notable exceptions are the studies of Lee, Mayers and Smith (1997) , Karels and McClatchey (1999) and Biswas, Fraser and Hebb (2000) . Duan, Moreau and Sealey [DMS] (1992) find that during [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] , only one fifth of the banks in their US sample of thirty commercial banks succeed to transfer risk to the FDIC. Saunders and Wilson (1995) report for the period 1927-1932, five years before the advent of DI in the US, that big commercial banks, by disciplining themselves, take less asset risk and hold relatively high capital ratios. Karels and McClatchey (1999) find no link between the adoption of DI and risktaking in the US credit union industry. Their time-series tests with industry average financial ratios for federal and state credit unions do not support the increased risk-taking hypothesis. Furthermore, their cross-sectional tests employing Iowa state-chartered credit unions' data show that those credit unions that were insured exhibited stronger capitalization and higher liquidity than their uninsured counterparts. For the period -1994 , Hovakimian and Kane (2000 find that capital regulation did not prevent US banks from shifting risk to the FDIC. Aggressive banks could extract a DI subsidy from the insurer. While their results diverge from those reported in DMS (1992), they show that the divergence may be due to differences in the time periods covered. Biswas, Fraser and Hebb (2000) report that announcements of DI premium changes lead to significant and economically meaningful opposite changes in equity values of banks. This implies that these organizations do not share costs of higher DI premiums or the benefit of lower DI premiums with their deposit and loan customers. Moreover, the largest banks in their sample, and banks with low equity capital appear to be most affected. Ely and Weaver (1991) find that over the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] , by having lower capital ratios rather than high asset risk, larger Bank Holding Companies are those that profit the most of the flat-rate DI system. They attribute this result to the higher ability of big institutions to circumvent regulation and avoid market discipline, as well as to the Too-Big-To-Fail doctrine. With regard to bigness, a natural question is, whether or not, banks merge to better exploit the flat-rate DI system. According to Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993) banks look for size to increase the likelihood of getting assistance in financial difficulties, and of obtaining 100% guaranty of their deposits from the FDIC in bankruptcy. 6 Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995) , meanwhile, find that banks merge to diversify rather than to exploit DI.
In Canada, Giammarino, Schwartz and Zechner (1989) find that the flat-rate DI system has resulted into a cross-subsidization among commercial banks during 1980-1985.
Moral hazard is not unique to the depository industry. It also shows up in insurance companies, (see for instance Lee, Mayers and Smith (1997) and Brewer, Mondschean and Strahan (1997) ). After this brief literature review, we next present our methodology.
METHODOLOGY
First, we present the various measures of risk and capital ratios. Then, we develop our hypotheses.
Measures of Bank Risk and Capital Ratios
Following Kane and Unal (1988), Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) and Madura and Zarruk (1995) among others, to estimate our market-determined measures of bank risk, we use the following two-factor model, with the market index and the interest-rate index as factors:
where Rj,t is the return of bank j at time t; Rm,t is the market return at time t; UI,t is the unexpected yield on the interest-rate index at time t, εj,t represents a random error term, and β0,j , βm,j and βI,j are the usual regression coefficients.
Three measures of risk are obtained: ßm, the market risk, ßI, the interest-rate risk and σε , the residual risk. We also compute another measure of risk, the standard deviation of equity returns or total risk, σR , directly from observed returns. Following Gallo, Apilado and Kolari (1996) as well as others, we estimate the total risk and each of the multi-factor market measures of risk using the previous 36 monthly returns. Additionally, we use the market equity data and contingent claims 6 As matter of fact, the average annual number of bank mergers and acquisitions was 498 between 1980 compared to 170 between 1960 and 1979 (Benston, Hunter and Wall, 1995 . approach developed by Ronn and Verma (1986) to estimate the asset risk σV from Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) shown in the Appendix.
Both market value and book value capital ratios are used. The market value capital ratio (MCAP) is defined as the number of shares outstanding times stock price over total asset, while the book value capital ratio (BCAP) is the book value of equity over total asset. 8 Furthermore, risk-shifting banks increase the actuarial value of DI, with no corresponding increase in the actual premium charged. Following Ronn and Verma (1986) , DMS (1992), Giammarino, Schwartz and Zechner (1989) among others, the risk-adjusted DI premium d as estimated by Eq. (A.4) in the Appendix will be also used for our empirical tests. d can be seen as an aggregate measure of bank risk since it captures both asset risk and financial leverage as well as market perceptions of regulatory closure rules.
Hypotheses and Test Specification
In this Section, we develop two hypotheses with regard to risk-taking incentives, and capital choices by Canadian banks following the introduction of flat-rate DI in Canada.
One way of exploiting the fixed-rate DI is to increase risk and/or to decrease capital ratios once DI is set up. Therefore, our first hypothesis is: Abstracting of any other counteracting disciplining factors such as charter value (e.g., Marcus, 1984) , Merton (1977) has shown that the risk-adjusted DI premium is an increasing function of asset risk and financial leverage. In the presence of both increases in risk and decreases in capital ratios (Hypothesis 1) one may hasten to conclude a presence of moral hazard. However, since risk increases and capital ratios decreases could be caused by factors other than banks' willingness and/or ability to exploit the flat-rate DI system to fit their risk appetite, this hypothesis constitutes necessary, but not sufficient condition for the manifestation of moral hazard. Therefore, our second hypothesis is stipulated as:
Hypothesis 2, H0 2 : After the establishment of the fixed-rate DI in Canada in 1967 Canadian chartered banks have adopted a risk-shifting behavior to exploit the DI system.
To test Hypothesis 2, we use a model developed by DMS (1992) and extended by Hovakimian and Kane (2000) . 11 Since the partial derivatives of the risk-adjusted DI premium d with respect to both asset risk σV and leverage B/V are positive (Merton, 1977) , risk-shifting banks would increase both σV and B/V to expropriate wealth from the CDIC. σV and V are estimated 10 See Goldberg and Saunders (1980) and Gropper and Osward (1996) for an example of use of time dummies.
11 Our study uses the original single period DMS (1992) model. Although Hovakimian and Kane (2000) use four different DI premium models, their findings are insensitive to the DI premium specification. simultaneously using the Ronn and Verma (1986) model presented in the Appendix. The riskshifting will be successful if the net effect results into an increase in the actuarial value of DI, with no corresponding increase in the actual premium charged. Nevertheless, banks may not be the moral hazard-type of banks. These may maintain their overall risk posture at the same level by offsetting increases (decreases) in asset risk by decreases (increases) in leverage, giving rise to a negative linkage between σV and B/V. Following DMS (1992), we first express the approximate change in the per dollar DI premium ( ∆ d), with respect to changes in asset risk ( ∆σV ) as follows:
Denoting α1 as [ ∂ (B/V)/ ∂σV ], Eq. (4) can be restated as:
Risk-shifting is successful when b1 > 0. Since from Merton (1977) After finding a positive and significant correlation between banks' market capital ratios and their asset risk, Saunders and Wilson (1995) conclude that there was no moral-hazard-type of risk-taking from banks in the US before the implementation of DI in 1933. In a 100-year period study, Saunders and Wilson (1999) report that Canadian banks' capital ratios were asset-risk-
where CAPj,t = {MCAP j,t, BCAPj,t}, Y' is the set of control variables found significant for the regression specified by Eq. (2), σVj,t is the volatility of bank j assets at time t; ej,t is a random error term, and a0 to aZ are the usual regression coefficients. MCAPj,t is now defined as Kj,t /Vj,t, with Kj,t being the market value of bank j equity at time t and Vj,t, the market value of bank j assets at time t.
Testing a1 < 0 in Eq. (6) is the same as testing α1 ≥ 0 in a leverage equation (a 1 = 1 -α1 ).
Meanwhile, to test Sub-hypothesis H0 2.2 , we specify the relation described by Eq. (5) as:
where dj,t is the risk-adjusted DI premium per dollar of deposit of bank j at time t; σVj,t is the volatility of bank j assets at time t; ηj,t is an error term; and b0 and b1 are the usual regression coefficients. ∆ denotes changes from the previous period. Note that although DMS (1992) and
Hovakimian and Kane (2000) specify Eq. (7) as linear, d is by construction non linear (see Eq. A.4 in the Appendix).
To recap, rejecting Sub-hypothesis 2.1 (i.e., a1 ≥ 0) and failing to reject Sub-hypothesis 2.2 (i.e., b1 ≤ 0) lead to a rejection of Hypothesis 2. If this were the case, Canadian banks have not adopted a risk-shifting behavior after the implementation of the fixed-rate DI system.
Control Variables for the Regressions
Banks' specific and accounting proxies of risk are typically: liquidity risk, interest-rate risk, credit risk, foreign exchange risk, and off-balance-sheet risk. As discussed in the introduction, one has to control also for market, regulatory and self-disciplinary mechanisms. With limited data, we do our best to control for the above bank specific and macro-economic determinants of bank risks.
For instance, we do not have maturity gap or duration data to control for interest-rate risk, and for credit risk, instead of using nonperforming loans (not available in the 1960s and the 1970s) we use our "second best" proxy, the variable RLOAN defined as the ratio of total loans to total assets, as in Brewer (1989) and Gallo, Apilado and Kolari (1996) . Bank loans are somewhat illiquid and subject to higher default risk than other assets. Therefore, a positive relation between the various measures of risk and RLOAN is expected. To control for liquidity risk, we use the ratio of marketable sensitive, implying that these were not the moral-hazard type of banks.
securities to total assets, RSECUR (see Avery and Berger, 1991; Gallo, Apilado and Kolari, 1996) .
A negative relation between the various measures of risk and RSECUR is expected. For leverage,
we use the ratio of equity to total assets, CAP. Since financial risk increases with leverage (i.e., decreases with capital), a priori, a negative relation between risks and CAP is expected. We use LOGTA as the logarithm of total assets to control for the size effect. As a measure of diversification (see Brewer, 1989, among others) , LOGTA is negatively related to risks, in particular to nonsystematic risk. As Keeley (1990); Galloway, Lee and Roden (1997) among others, we use the variable CHARTER, defined as the ratio of market-to-book value of assets to proxy self-discipline of banks' managers. Since banks retain their charter values only if they survive, a bank with higher charter value is less likely to take excessive risk. Therefore, a negative relation between CHARTER and various risks is expected. We measure off-balance sheet activities risk by the variable OFFB, defined as the ratio of bankers' acceptances over total assets. Assuming that off-balance sheet items are used to hedge banks' exposure to various risks or to diversify activities, OFFB is negatively related to risks.
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For capital equations, we use some of the control variables suggested in Wall and Peterson (1987) . Besides size (LOGTA) and charter value (CHARTER), we use the coefficient of variation of returns on assets (CVROA) (defined as σV /RV, where RV is a market determined return on assets), the implied asset risk ( σV ), the ratio of other liabilities to total assets (OTHLIAB), and the return on equity (ROE). CVROA and σV are measures of banks' assets returns volatility. Since higher variation of returns or asset risk implies increased probability of bankruptcy, we expect a positive relation between CAP and the variables CVROA and σV . Other non-deposit liabilities consist mainly of uninsured subordinated debt used as second-tier capital. Since these vary in the same direction as primary capital, a positive relation between CAP and OTHLIAB is expected. We also expect a positive relation between CAP and ROE since retained earnings strengthen bank capital positions.
Finally, to control for macro-economic factors for both our risk and capital specifications, we use the growth of gross national product, GNPGROWTH. For the risk equations, we also use OIL, the price of a barrel of oil, to account for the impact of the 1970s oil crisis on Canadian banks' risk. Next, we describe our data. (Bordo, Redish and Rockoff, 1995) .
DATA
The situation remains unchanged, with a percentage of 87% of domestic banking assets (Shaffer, 1993) . Our sample represents nearly the population of banks in Canada. Working with limited data is a Canadian reality. 14 Our results follow.
RESULTS
We present the empirical findings in two parts: first, we report the descriptive statistics on the risk measures. Then, we discuss the results from the tests of our hypotheses.
Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1a, 1b and 1c present the summary statistics on returns of an equal-weighted portfolio of the big five banks (Table 1a) , the variable definition (Table 1b ) and the summary statistics for the control variables (Table 1c) .
Monthly average returns are positive and range from 0.5% (1959-1962) to 2.1% (1977-1980) . In general, returns are volatile. For the full period 1956-1982, both skewness and kurtosis are positive and significant at 5% level. These two statistics indicate that returns are not normally distributed. Furthermore, the Ljung-Box Portmanteau statistics Q(k) and Q²(k) indicate the presence of auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity at least of the order 2. Therefore, we correct for both auto-correlation (Newey and West, 1987) and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) in our estimation.
For our two-factor market model, the market index is the Toronto Stock Exchange index, TSE300. As interest-rate index, we use the unexpected yield on long-term government bonds (see, for instance, Madura and Zarruk, 1995). Long-term government bond yields are highly autocorrelated and heteroskedastic. Then, we use a GARCH (1,1) methodology to forecast bond yields, from which we obtain unexpected yields. As in Kane and Unal (1988), we do not orthogonalize the indexes to correct for multicollinearity. Giliberto (1985) argues that orthogonalization of indexes yields biased estimates. Furthermore, the choice of the reference index to orthogonalize is not obvious (see Kane and Unal, 1988) . The DI premiums paid by banks as a percentage of their total revenues, DIPREV, range from 0.19 % to 0.58 %, with a mean of 0.3780% or 1/270 th of total revenues. 15 The numbers are likely higher than the actual amounts, since not all deposits are contractually insured by the CDIC. We note that banks' average leverage is over 96%, and charter value, on average, is slightly higher than 1.
Hypotheses Tests
To have roughly equal numbers of observations in each time intervals, we divide our sample period into three sub-periods of eight years, namely: PRE-DI (1959 -1966 ; POST-DI1 (1967 -1974 and POST-DI2 (1975 -1982 Total risk ( σR ), market risk (ß m ), asset risk ( σV ) and residual risk ( σε ) medians are higher in POST-DI1 (1967 -1974 , than those in PRE-DI (1959 -1966 , increasing from 0.0425 to 0.0634 ( σR ); from 0.8125 to 1.0878 (ß m ); from 0.0121 to 0.0133 ( σV ); and from 0.0238 to 0.0406 ( σε ), respectively. These increases are significant at 1% level, except for the asset risk which is not significant. The interest-rate risk (ß I ) decreases from 0.5168 to 0.1377, significant at 1%. When we compare increases in medians of total and residual risks in POST-DI2 (1975 -1982 to those in PRE-DI, these increase remains significant at the same level. A decrease is noted in POST-DI2 relative to PRE-DI for the market risk, the interest-rate risk and the asset risk at respective levels of 10%, 10% and 1%. Median total risk, market risk and asset risk values decrease significantly in subperiod POST-DI2 relative to those in POST-DI1. In spite of these decreases, median total risk and median residual risk are higher in POST-DIT (1967 -1982 With regard to capital, we record in Table 2b a progressive decrease in average capital ratios either in book or market values from one sub-period to another.
POST-DI2. Regressions use all the 115 observations.
Insert Table 2a about here   Insert Table 2b about here For instance, the mean capital ratio in terms of market value decreases first from 8.03 % (PRE-DI) to 6.05% (POST-DI1), and then to 3.03% (POST-DI2). We note similar decreases during the whole sub-period post DI [POST-DIT] (4.54%). All median difference tests are significant at 1% level.
17 This result is consistent with the decreasing trend in the US banks' capital ratios reported by Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995) .
To find further support for Hypothesis 1, we run the regressions Eqs. (2) and (3). Results are reported in the following Tables 2c and 2d .
In general, for risk measures, the hypothesis of increasing risk post-DI is confirmed since the coefficient λ1 for the variable IDI is positive and significant for total, market, asset and residual risks (see Table 2c ). λ1 is negative and significant for the interest-rate risk.
With regard to our control variables, RSECUR is generally not significant, with the exception of the asset risk. This result is similar to the one in Gallo, Apilado and Kolari (1996) where the relation is negative for various measures of risk, but only significant for the interest-rate risk. As expected, the variable RLOAN is positively related to all proxies of risk, as in Hassan (1992) . 18 However, the relation is not significant. Albeit not significant, the variable CAP is negatively related to all measures of risk. A similar result was reported in Gallo, Apilado and Kolari (1996) who found no significant relationship between leverage and risk for their sample of US BHC over the period [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] . The variable LOGTA is negatively and significantly associated with market and asset risks at 5% and 10 % levels respectively. For total, interest-rate and residual risks, it is positive, but not significant. Although the variable CHARTER is negatively associated with market, interest-rate and asset risks, it is not significant. This result is weak, as compared to 17 The book value capital ratio is defined here as the shareholder equity over total assets, or primary capital ratio. Subordinated debts are excluded from the total capital. While these slightly increase the level of BCAP, their inclusion in the capital do not however change the conclusion reached in this study.
18 Hassan (1992) , however, used the ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets as a proxy of credit risk.
Insert Tables 2c and 2d about here the one in Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996) who find that charter value is negatively and significantly related to total, market and residual risks for a US sample of banks. 19 The variable OFFB is negatively related to all proxies of risk, and significant for total and asset risks. This concurs with the finding of Hassan, Karel and Peterson (1994) that off-balance sheet activities are risk-reducing. Canadian banks were affected by the oil crisis, since the coefficient for the variable OIL is positive for the total risk, the market risk, the asset risk and the residual risk, and significant for total and asset risks. The growth in the gross national product, GNPGROWTH is positively and significantly related to the interest-rate risk but negatively and significantly linked to the asset risk.
We additionally introduce a time dummy variable, D75, to depict the sub-period [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] (see discussion on the sub-period division above). We find that while the coefficient for this dummy variable is negatively related to total, interest-rate, asset and residual risks, it is significant only for the total risk. We obtain the same results for the asset risk from the simultaneous equations with capital ratios. However, to save space, these are not presented.
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For capital ratios, the coefficient of IDI is positive and significant when the market value of capital ratio is used as an independent variable, but it turns negative when the book value of capital is used (Table 2d) . One possible explanation for this contradiction is that with implicit or explicit DI subsidies to the insured banks, the market value of equity is composed of two parts: the intrinsic value of equity and the DI subsidy (see Barth, Page and Brumbaugh, 1992) . Once DI became explicit in Canada, the market value of equity could be a biased estimate of the intrinsic value.
Nevertheless, more can be said on the extent of the DI subsidy only after testing our hypotheses.
Therefore, we underscore the results with book capital in which after controlling for other determinants, the coefficient of IDI remains negative and significant at 1% level. This clearly suggests a reduction of book capital ratios after the introduction of flat-rate DI. This result concurs with the one obtained by median difference tests discussed above.
With regard to other control variables, the coefficient for σV is positive and significant for both the market and the book value of capital. Canadian banks appear to have adjusted upwards their capital to compensate for increased asset risk, in line with the results in Shrieves and Dahl (1992) who find a positive and significant relation between changes in capital and changes in risk (estimated by a weighted accounting risk index) for US banks. The coefficient for CVROA is not significant, either for market or for book capital ratios. Although Berger (1995) finds a positive and significant sign for the variable ROE, it is not significant in our study. Size (LOGTA) is negatively related to capital ratios, and significant for MCAP. The variable OTHLIAB is positively and significantly associated to capital ratios at 5% level. Although one expects banks with higher charter value to hold more capital to retain their valuable charter value, CHARTER is negative and significant at 1% level for MCAP and at 10% level for BCAP. Saunders and Wilson (1997) argue that consolidation in the banking sector has produced larger branched banks, which were more able to diversify risk. This diversification could serve as a substitute for bank capital otherwise required as a cushion for insolvency. The macro-economic variable, GNPGROWTH is negatively related to capital ratios, but significant only when the market value of capital is used as a dependent variable.
To sum up, in spite of the results obtained for the interest-rate risk and market capital ratios, we find empirical support for Hypothesis 1, i.e., following the advent of DI, Canadian chartered banks' risk increased, and their (book) capital ratios decreased. 21 We discuss next results for Hypothesis 2.
The analyses conducted so far fail to reject Hypothesis 1. Increases in banks' risk and decreases in capital ratio result into increases in bankruptcy probability. If one were content with this hypothesis, he hastens to conclude a manifestation of moral hazard in Canada following the introduction of flat-rate DI in 1967. However, as discussed above, since Hypothesis 1 constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition for the presence of moral hazard, to set the score, we need to further test risk-shifting by means of Hypothesis 2, à la DMS (1992).
H0 2 : After the establishment of the fixed-rate DI in Canada in 1967 Canadian chartered banks have adopted a risk-shifting behavior to exploit the system. 21 While increases in banks' risk and in financial leverage may be observed, these do not necessarily imply a presence of moral hazard if expected returns on asset do play an important role in stabilizing the probability of bankruptcy. As noted by Santomero and Chung (1992) , "if an increase in the volatility of asset returns is accompanied by the increase in the average rate of returns, then it is possible that the probability of the failure of the firm may actually decrease". Then, to complement Hypothesis 1, we test an associate hypothesis stated as: "To the extent that an increase in banks' risk and/or a decrease in capital ratios were observed, their net effect was an increase in the probability of bankruptcy of Canadian banks", where the probability of bankruptcy is defined as in Santomero and Chung (1992) . Median difference test results (available upon request) show that following the introduction of flat-rate DI in Canada, the theoretical probability of bankruptcy of Canadian chartered banks has increased.
Since two Sub-hypotheses are tested as part of H0 2 , we begin with H0 2.1 . For all sub-periods, the asset risk σV is positively related to capital ratios, either in market or in book value. This relation is highly significant in all cases for the market capital ratio, and in all but one case when we use the book capital ratio. Based on the positive and significant relation between CAP and σV , we reject Sub-hypothesis H0 2.1 . This suggests that Canadian banks have adjusted upwards their capital for increases in the asset risk. Banks have already acted in this manner pre-1967 and the introduction of flat-rate DI in 1967 has not altered this behavior. After finding a positive and significant correlation between banks' market capital ratios and the asset risk, Saunders and Wilson (1995) conclude that there was a general absence of the moral-hazard-type risk-taking of banks in the US before the implementation of DI in 1933. Our result parallels their conclusion. The positive and significant relation between the market capital ratio and the asset risk in all sub-periods suggests that the best capitalized banks were taking the most risk, either before or after the official introduction of rate DI. This implies self-discipline by banks, since over the period of study, there was no explicit regulatory capital requirement in Canada. It is important to note however, that our cross-sectional results can mask individual deviations.
Rejection of Sub-hypothesis H0 2.1 is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the absence of risk-shifting. Risk-shifting is contained when b1 ≤ 0 in Sub-hypothesis 2.2. Whether or not this condition is met depends on the relative size of a1. Let us test now Sub-hypothesis 2.2.
Insert Table 3a about here ♦ H0 2.2 : b1 ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ 0 in Eq. (7), ∆ dj,t = b0 + b1 ∆σVj,t + ηj,t . Table 3c ). 23 This gives support to our Sub-hypothesis H0 2.2 .
Furthermore, in testing Sub-hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2, we include an interaction variable IDISIGMA defined as IDI times ∆ SIGMAV as another independent variable. Its coefficient is positive and significant for the MCAP regression, and negative and significant for the ∆ d
regression. This concurs with our finding that post-DI in Canada, chartered banks have continued to adjust their capital for changes in the asset risk, and have not expropriated wealth from the CDIC.
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Rejecting Sub-hypothesis H0 2.1 and failing to reject Sub-hypothesis H0 2.2 leads us to reject 22 As indicated earlier, in Section 3.1, risk-adjusted DI premiums are estimated using the Ronn and Verma (1986) RV model (see Eq. (A4) of the Appendix). For the PRE-DI period, we assume a free (i.e., with zero premium) implicit insurance from the government. We also use as dependent variable the RV risk-adjusted DI premium minus zero (for PRE-DI) and the RV risk-adjusted DI premium minus the estimated amount of DI premium actually paid (for POST-DI) and obtain similar results. Note that if the flat rate was set too low at the outset, there can be some moral hazard risk shifting even if Sub-hypothesis H0 2.1 does not hold. However, since it is unlikely that the bank subsidizes the CDIC (i.e., the DI premium is set too high), Subhypothesis H0 2.2 by and large does signify the absence of risk shifting. 23 To account for non-linearity (see Eq. A.4 in the Appendix which is clearly non linear), we include ∆σ²V as independent variable. As shown in Table 3c , the results are unchanged. The coefficient of ∆σV remains negative, and significant for all post-DI sub-periods. Further, when using the natural logarithm of both d and σV we obtain similar (not shown) results. 24 One can ask why, overall, banks' risks have increased and capital ratios decreased while at the same time, there was a positive correlation between asset risk and capital ratios. Saunders and Wilson (1999) provide an explanation to such contradictory results. These authors decompose the market capital ratio into two parts, namely the asset-risk sensitive component and the non-asset-risk sensitive component (common to all banks). Further, they show that in the US, Canada and United Kingdom, while the risk-sensitive component is effectively related to changes in asset-risk, the non-risk-sensitive component shows a strong secular decrease, with the net result being a decreasing trend in the overall market capital ratio. The continuous decrease in the non-risk-sensitive capital ratio may be due to increased exploitation of safety net guarantee. Hypothesis H0 2 . We then conclude that after the introduction in 1967 of the official flat-rate DI system in Canada, Canadian banks have not succeeded in shifting risk to the CDIC.
Increases in risk after 1967 may be explained by increased volatility in the Canadian financial markets, and specifically in the financial services industry. We observe increases in the Canadian banks equity returns volatilities, as well as in the Canadian market index and the financial services index volatilities after 1967. This tends to suggest that the observed increases in individual bank volatilities were synchronous with a general upward trend in the market and in the financial services industry. 
CONCLUSION
Inferring from the risk postures of Canadian chartered banks around the years following the official implementation of flat-rate DI in Canada, we formulate two hypotheses associated with the well-known DI moral hazard problem. Overall, we find no empirical support for the hypothesis of moral hazard in the Canadian banking industry following the establishment of DI in 1967. The total risk, the market risk, the residual risk and marginally, the asset risk of Canadian chartered banks have increased after 1967, especially during the sub-period 1967-1974. During the same sub-period, (book value) capital ratios have decreased. The finding of increased risk and decreased capital ratios is generally consistent with the one in Saunders and Wilson (1999) who report for Canadian banks throughout the 1960s and 1970s, increasing volatility of assets, increasing volatility of equity and decreasing capitalization. Further investigation fails to relate these results to a change in Canadian banks' behavior toward exploitating the official flat-rate DI system. By and large, our results also parallel those of Saunders and Wilson (1995) who find before the advent of official DI in the US in 1933, commercial banks were not the moral hazard-type of risk-taking banks. Finally, our results are consistent with Saunders and Wilson (1999) ' finding of a link between the market capital ratio and the asset risk, and no cyclical or secular trend in the asset-risk-sensitive component of capital in Canadian banks, during the last century . Given that Canadian banks adjust their capital in the same direction as their asset risk, the new risk-based DI premium structure adopted by the CDIC in 1999 may be a good idea in terms of fairness, but it is unlikely to have an effect on Canadian banks risk.
While our study is among the first in Canada to empirically investigate the flat-rate DI moral hazard hypothesis, it suffers from some shortcomings. First, available data, that we manually extract from various annual reports from the beginning of 1955, are not detailed, so that we cannot perform more powerful tests that are possible in US studies. Moreover, income statements are not available until 1964 and, until the mid 1970s, financial statements were only annually reported.
Second, our bank sample is rather limited. We have to content with only five banks, which obliges us to undertake cross-sectionally time series regressions for acceptable numbers of observations, while an analysis on individual banks may have been richer. After all, these shortcomings are basically related to the structure of the Canadian banking industry that is significantly more concentrated than the one in the US.
APPENDIX IMPLICIT VOLATILITY OF ASSETS AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUM
This appendix presents the procedure used to estimate the implicit volatility of bank's assets σV and the deposit insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits d.
As a call option on bank's assets (Black and Scholes, 1973) , the equity of a bank K can be written as:
From Ito lemma, relating σR and σV , we obtain a second equation written as:
In these equations, N(.) represents a cumulative standard normal distribution function; K is the market value of bank's equity; σR is the instantaneous standard deviation of equity return; V refers to the unobserved value of bank assets; σV is the instantaneous standard deviation of assets returns; B represents the book value of bank's liabilities; T is the time until the next audit of bank's assets and ρ is the regulatory policy parameter.
Solving the simultaneous Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2), unobserved values of V and σV can be estimated. As in Ronn and Verma (1986) for US banks, and in Giammarino, Schwartz and Zechner (1989) for Canadian banks, we set ρ at 0.97, and assume T to be one year.
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From Merton (1977) , the total deposit insurance premium (TDIP) is:
B1 is the book value of insured deposits; B2 is the book value of all uninsured liabilities; B = B1 + B2; δ represents the dividend per dollar of assets and n is the number of time per period the dividend is paid.
Dividing both sides of Eq. (A.3) by B1 the premium can be stated in terms of the insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits d as follows: Descriptive statistics on monthly returns.
Descriptive statistics of monthly returns on an equal-weighted portfolio of Canadian chartered banks. Statistics are computed using 36 months, from November of the beginning year to October of the ending year. RISK j,t = λ0 + λ1IDIt + λ2D75t + λ3RSECURj,t-1 + λ4RLOANj,t-1 + λ5CAPj,t-1 + λ6LOGTAj,t-1 + λ7CHARTERj,t-1 + λ8OFFBj,t-1 + λ9OILt-1 + λ10GNPGROWTHt -1 + λ11RISKj,t -1 + εj,t.
Parameter coefficients are estimated using the pooled cross-sectionally time-series methodology. The t-value is enclosed by parentheses. The sample is composed of the biggest Canadian chartered banks. *** = Significant at 1%; ** = Significant at 5%; * = Significant at 10%.
Table 2d
Regression tests for Hypothesis H0 1 : Decrease in capital ratios following the implementation of DI in 1967. Annual data .
CAP j,t = γ0 + γ1IDIt + γ2σVj,t-1 +γ 3 CVROA j,t-1 + γ4ROEj,t-1 + γ5OTHLIABj,t-1 + γ6LOGTAj,t-1 + γ7CHARTERj,t-1 + γ8OFFBj,t-1 + γ9GNPGROWTHt-1 + γ10CAPj,t-1 + νj,t.
Parameter coefficients are estimated using the pooled cross-sectionally time-series methodology. The t-value is enclosed by parentheses. The sample is composed of the biggest Canadian chartered banks. SYSTEM refers to the case where the capital equation is estimated simultaneously with the asset risk equation using the Two-stage Least Square methodology. *** = Significant at 1%; ** = Significant at 5%; * = Significant at 10%. *** = Significant at 1%; ** = Significant at 5%; * = Significant at 10%. MCAP = Market value of equity to market value of assets. BCAP = Book value of equity to total assets. SYSTEM refers to the simultaneous estimation with the asset risk equation using the Two-stage Least Square methodology. Parameter coefficients are estimated using the pooled cross-sectionally time-series methodology. The t-value is enclosed by parentheses. d is the risk-adjusted deposit insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits. 1959-1966 1967-1974 1975-1982 1967-1982 *** = Significant at 1%; ** = Significant at 5%; * = Significant at 10%. Parameter coefficients are estimated using the pooled cross-sectionally time-series methodology. The value is enclosed by parentheses. d is the risk-adjusted deposit insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits. 1959-1966 1967-1974 1975-1982 1967-1982 *** = Significant at 1%; ** = Significant at 5%; * = Significant at 10%.
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